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Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act: A Suggested Standard 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act prohibits "[e]very contract, com-
bination . . . or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce."1 By 
its very nature, a contract, combination or conspiracy necessitates 
more than one actor; each requires the concerted action of two or 
more "minds." Thus, a restraint of trade achieved by a single cor-
porate entity lacks the plurality of participants necessary for a section 
1 violation. 
Neither officers, directors, employees nor divisions within a single 
corporation have ever been held to have conspired with either the 
corporation or with one another.2 However, there remains a ques-
tion of the extent to which coordinated activity, arrangements, or 
agreements between a parent corporation and its subsidiaries3 or 
among the subsidiaries themselves can be a "contract, combination, 
or conspiracy" in -violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act. A 
theory of intra-enterprise conspiracy4 has arisen from a series of Su-
preme Court decisions5 suggesting that the mere fact of separate in-
corporation in a parent-subsidiary organization is sufficient to create 
the plurality necessary for a finding of conspiracy between the en-
tities. Although the government has been reluctant to press this 
theory in antitrust enforcement, 6 it has provided a basis for private 
actions7 and could potentially be applied to virtually all parent-subsid-
iary relations. 8 
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (Supp. V 1975). 
2. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 
416 F.2d 71, 80-84 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1972). 
3. For purposes of this Note, it is assumed that the subsidiaries are created and 
either wholly owned or substantially owned by the parent corporation. If not wholly 
owned, then it is further assumed that the minority owners hold only for investment. 
For the problems that might be presented if these assumptions are not met, see text 
at notes 35-36 infra. 
4. Intra-enterprise conspiracy refers to a conspiracy among separately incorpo-
rated units of a parent-subsidiary enterprise. Conspiracies among separate divisions, 
officers, or directors of a single corporation are labeled intra-corporate conspiracies. 
See Note, All in the Family: When Will Internal Discussion Be Labeled Intra-En-
terprise Conspiracy?, 14 DuQ. L. REv. 63, 64 (1975). 
5. See Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-
42 (1968); Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593, 598 (1951); 
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 (1951); 
United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 (1947). 
6. See text at notes 73-77 infra. 
1. See, e.g., George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 
F.2d 25 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors 
Corp., 362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit 
Co., 358 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (dictum). 
8. Because of its potential for broad application, commentators have been critical 
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Section I of this Note analyzes the cases in which the Supreme 
Court has implied a doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy. Section 
II then sets forth the theoretical and practical difficulties that such 
a doctrine entails. Section III, in turn, considers previous proposals 
for limiting the scope of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and 
examines their deficiencies. Finally, section IV presents an alter-
native analysis of the intra-enterprise conspiracy issue and proposes 
a standard for determining when application of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act to parent-subsidiary relations is inappropriate. 
I. GENESIS OF THE DOCTRINE 
There are four major cases in which the Court has developed a 
doctrine of intra-enterprise conspiracy: United States v. Yellow Cab 
Co.,° Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, lnc.,10 
Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. United States,11 and, most recently, 
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp.12 These de-
cisions share several features: Each suggests the validity of an intra-
enterprise conspiracy theory without extensively analyzing it13 and 
without defining the scope of its application. Moreover, in each case 
there was at least one alternative basis for finding an antitrust vio-
lation by the defendant. Hence, the novel theory of intra-enterprise 
conspiracy was not necessary for a finding of substantive liability. 
United States v. Yellow Cab Co.14 is the seminal case on the issue 
of intra-enterprise conspiracy. In 1929, Morris Markin, who was 
president, general manager, and controlling shareholder of the 
Checker Cab Manufacturing Corporation (CCM), began to acquire 
control of taxicab companies in various cities. These companies 
of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine and have sought to limit its application. 
See Barndt, Two Trees or One?-The Problem of Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy, 23 
MoNT. L. REV. 158 (1962); Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass-Twenty-
First Annual Antitrust Review, 51 CALIF. L. R.Ev. 182 (1969); Kempf, Bathtub Coll• 
spiracies: Has Seagram Distilled a More Potent Brew?, 24 Bus. LAw. 173 (1968); 
McQuade, Conspiracy, Multicorporate Enterprises, and Section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, 41 VA. L REV. 183 (1955); Stengel, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under Section 
1 of the Sherman Act, 35 Miss. L.J. 5 (1963); Willis & Pitofsky, Antitrust Conse-
quences of Using Corporate Subsidiaries, 43 N.Y.U.L. REV. 20 (1968); Note, supra 
note 4; Note, Intra-Enterprise Conspiracy Under the Sherman Act, 63 YALE L.J. 372 
(1954). 
9. 332 U.S. 218 (1947). 
10. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). 
11. 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
12. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
13. [T]he remarkable thing about each of the ... cases which might be con• 
strued as supporting a theory of conspiracy within a multicorporate enterprise 
is the scant attention they devote to the point. Each opinion tends to ignore 
the requirement of duality and to concentrate on a consideration of predatory 
practices. In some cases the single enterprise defense was only faintly argued, or 
not even raised. 
McQuade, supra note 8, at 188. 
14. 332 U.S. 218 (1947). 
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were then compelled to buy their cabs from CCM, and the access of 
other cab manufacturers to these purchasers was thus foreclosed.15 
The government charged CCM, its sales subsidiary, and various 
operating companies with conspiring in violation of sections 1 and 
2 of the Sherman Act.16 
In reversing the lower court's dismissal of the complaint, the 
Supreme Court held that the alleged facts supported a charge of con-
spiracy under section 1.17 The Court stated that an unreasonable 
restraint of trade 
may result as readily from a conspiracy among those who are affil-
iated or integrated under common ownership as from a conspiracy 
among those who are otherwise independent . . . . [T]he common 
ownership and control of the various corporate appellees are impo-
tent to liberate the alleged combination and conspiracy from the im-
pact of the Act.18 
Although this language implies that affiliates in a parent-subsidiary 
organization are entirely unprotected from a finding of conspiracy, 
a close reading of the case indicates that such an implication is not 
necessary to its holding. 
First, the Court observed that the restraint of trade "was the pri-
mary object of the combination."19 From this and other language20 
it may be inferred that various independent firms had conspired in 
creating the combination itself. If indeed this was a combination 
that effectuated a prior conspiracy among independent entities, then 
common ownership and affiliation in the resulting arrangement 
would clearly be no defense to an antitrust attack: The initial con-
spiracy itself would be a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 
and the subsequent combination could be attacked as the "fruit" of 
that conspiracy. 21 
15. 332 U.S. at 221-24. At the time of the suit, the defendants, through acquisi-
tion and stock purchases, controlled 5,000 cab licenses. They held 100% of the li-
censes issued in Pittsburgh, 86% in Chicago, 58% in Minneapolis, and ·15% in New 
York. 332 U.S. at 224. 
16. 332 U.S. at 220. 
17. 332 U.S. at 227-28. 
18. 332 U.S. at 227 (emphasis added). 
19. 332 U.S. at 227. 
20. For example, the Court argued that "any affiliation or integration flowing 
from an illegal conspiracy cannot insulate the conspirators ... " 332 U.S. at 227 
(emphasis added). The Court emphasized this point by stating that "the fact that 
the competition restrained is that between affiliated corporations cannot . serve to 
negative the statutory violation where, as here, the affiliation is assertedly one of 
the means of effectuating the illegal conspiracy . .•. " 332 U.S. at 229 (emphasis 
added). 
21. See Beacon Fruit•& Produce Co. v. H. Harris & Co., 152 F. Supp. 702 (D. 
Mass. 1957), affd. per curiam, 260 F.2d 958 (1st Cir. 1958), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 
984 (1959). In that case the court refused to find that the defendants were merely 
parts of a single corporate entity incapable of conspiring. It implied that a con-
spiracy could be found if the plaintiffs substantiated their claim that "in fact the 
individual defendants here conspired to form the defendant corporation as a mere 
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Thus, in situations such as Y el/ow Cab, in which a conspiracy is 
alleged between separate "persons" who subsequently combine to 
effectuate their conspiracy, a court's language attacking that arrange-
ment might appear to support an intra-enterprise conspiracy theory. 
However, what might really be of concern to the court is not a con-
spiracy subsequent to combination, but the conspiracy among inde-
pendent "persons" that produced the combination. This view sug-
gests that the Court in Y el/ow Cab was not necessarily announcing 
a broad intra-enterprise conspiracy theory. 
A second factor in Y el/ow Cab that undercuts the implication of 
a broad theory of intra-enterprise conspiracy is the lack of common 
ownership. Evidence that common ownership dipped as low as 
eighteen per cent suggests that a parent-subsidiary relation did not 
exist, but rather that the combination was among independent con-
cerns, with the "parent" merely holding some shares in each. 
Clearly, such a limited degree of common ownership does not grant 
immunity under the Sherman Act to agreements or conspiracies 
between independent business units. 22 • 
Thus, if the gravaman of Yellow Cab was a conspiracy among in-
dependent entities, either preceding the combination or occurring 
after the combination if the "parent's" stock ownership was not con-
trolling or, perhaps, was a section 2 "attempt to monopolize,"23 then 
the Court's result would be correct because subsequent common 
ownership, affiliation, or integration would not operate as a defense 
to the charge of conspiracy. However, this result would not support 
the implication that formally separate parent and subsidiary corpo-
instrumentality to take over the partnership business as a step in securing control 
of the market and imposing a restraint of trade for their individual benefit." 152 
F. Supp. at 704. In addition, see Northern Sec. v. United States, 193 U.S. 197 
(1904), in which the Supreme Court reached a similar finding of section 1 illegality 
based on the "combination" language of the section. 
22. See United States v. Citizens & S. Natl. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 117 (1975). 
23. It has been suggested that Yellow Cab involved an "attempt to monopolize" 
violation under section 2 of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2 (Supp. V 1975), which 
prohibits monopolization, attempts to monopolize, or conspiracy to monopolize. See, 
e.g., Stengel, supra note 8, at 12; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 40-41. Support 
for this argument is found in United States v. Columbia Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495 
( 1948), where the Court stated that in Yellow Cab "the government charged that 
the defendants had combined and conspired to effect the restraints in question with 
the intent and purpose of monopolizing the cab business .... " 334 U.S. at 522 
(emphasis added). 
If, as the Court in United States v. Columbia implies through its emphasis on 
"intent" and "purpose" to monopolize, Yellow Cab is in fact an "attempt to monopo-
lize" case, then the conspiracy language in the case could have applied to a "conspir-
acy to monopolize" violation under section 2. Unlike the conspiracy element of 
section 1, a conspiracy to monopolize under section 2 might be found even among 
directors, officers, or employees of a single corporation, as well as among affiliated 
firms in a parent-subsidiary enterprise. REPORT OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY 
GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 30-31 (1955) 
[hereinafter cited as ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT]; Stengel, supra note 
8, at 26, 
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rations could provide the plurality of participation necessary for the 
finding of a conspiracy.24 
A similar analysis is applicable to Timken Roller Bearing Co. v. 
United States,25 in which the Supreme Court also implied a finding 
of intra-enterprise conspiracy. The Timken Roller Bearing Com-
pany (American Timken) was the dominant producer of tapered 
roller bearings in the United States. In 1928, American Timken and 
one Dewar, an English businessman, cooperated in purchasing the 
stock of British Timken, Ltd. (British Timken), a former licensee 
of American Timken, and in organizing Societe Anonyme Frangais 
Timken (French Timken). American, British, and French Timken 
then began a series of "business agreements" to fix prices, to allocate 
world markets, and to limit competition. 26 
In its defense to- a. section 1 antitrust suit, American Timken 
argued that the agreements were reasonable because they were an-
cillary both to a joint venture between itself and Dewar and .to its 
trademark licenses with British Timken and French Timken. 27 The 
Court clearly rejected this position: 
Our prior decisions plainly establish that agreements providing for 
an aggregation of trade restraints such as those existing in this case 
are illegal under the Act . . . . The fact that there is common 
ownership or control of the contracting corporations does not liberate 
them from the impact of the antitrust laws. 28 
In a vigorous dissent Justice Jackson interpreted the Court's opin-
ion as holding that the mere fact of separate incorporation of parent 
and subsidiary firms provided the plurality for a section 1 con-
spiracy: 
It is admitted that if Timken had, within its own corporate organiza-
tion, set up separate departments . . . "that would not be a con-
spiracy; we must have two entities to have a conspiracy." . . . The 
doctrine now applied to foreign commerce is that foreign subsidiaries 
organized by an American corporation are "separate persons," and 
any agreement between them and the parent corporation to do that 
which is legal for the parent alone is an unlawful conspiracy. 
. . . [Timken] is forbidden thus to deal with and utilize subsidiaries 
to exploit foreign territories, because "parent and subsidiary cor-
porations must accept the consequences of maintaining separate cor-
porate entities," and that consequence is conspiracy to restxain 
trade.29 
24. The authors of the ATIORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 
23, at 32, offer another analysis of Yellow Cab that limits this implication. They 
state that the enterprise "grew out of mergers of previously independent competitors, 
thus making them 'combinations' within the meaning of the Act." 
25. 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
26. 341 U.S. at 595-96. 
27. 341 U.S. at 5!}7. 
28. 341 U.S. at 598 (citations omitted). 
29. 341 U.S. at 606-07. 
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However, given the facts of the case, Jackson was overly broad 
in his interpretation of the Court's holding. AB was the case with 
Yellow Cab,30 the Court's conclusion in Timken might have been 
based on two alternative rationales. First, the district court found 
that American Timken's ownership in the foreign firms, and the 
restrictive agreements among them, were the product of a conspiracy 
between the independent entities American Timken and Dewar.31 
The arrangement merely perpetuated the license restrictions that 
had begun in 1909; it eliminated competition that might have arisen 
between the separate firms upon expiration of Timken's patent 
monoply.32 Just as in Yellow Cab,33 the very combination of firms 
into a single formal enterprise and the subsequent activities of that 
enterprise were objectionable because they effectuated a previous 
conspiracy among independent entities. 
Second, the degree of American Timken's ownership and control 
of the various corporations did not support Jackson's view that the 
foreign firms were actually subsidiaries of the parent. Although 
American Timken owned thirty per cent of British Timken and fifty 
per cent of French Timken, Dewar controlled the day-to-day actions 
of the foreign firms, and, as the lower court stated, "British Timken 
and French Timken retained their corporate independence and 
jealously guarded their interests in dealing with [American Tim-
ken] ."31 
Timken, like Yellow Cab, therefore actually involved a conspiracy 
between independent entities-American Timken and the individ-
ual Dewar-and the arrangement only resembled a parent-subsid-
iary relation. Thus, not only was the arrangement a continuation 
of a conspiracy between independent "persons," but the corpo-
rations, despite some common ownership, were indeed independent 
firms providing a plurality of participants for conspiracy. The de-
cision, therefore, should not be seen as holding that agreements 
among affiliated firms in a genuine parent-subsidiary organization 
can result in a finding of conspiracy. 
These cases highlight the importance of two factors that must be 
noted when considering the possibility of intra-enterprise conspiracy. 
First, a distinction should be made between subsidiaries created by 
the parent (i.e., internal expansion) and those formed by merger, by 
acquisition, or in arrangement with other independent persons (i.e., 
joint ventures).35 Subsidiaries formed in the second manner create 
30. See text at notes 19-24 supra. 
31. See 83 F. Supp. 284, 312 (N.D. Ohio 1949). 
32. See 83 F. Supp. at 289-95. 
33. See text at notes 19-21 supra. 
34. 83 F. Supp. at 311. 
35. The Court in Yellow Cab noted this difference when it implied that there 
was a distinction between subsidiaries "obtained by normal expansion to meet the 
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a substantial risk that a conspiracy will be found between the pre-
viously independent units even when they are subsequently acting 
as parts of a single enterprise. The combination and arrangement 
between the "parent" and "subsidiary" may then be seen, as in 
Timken and Yellow Cab, as effectuating a conspiracy between these 
independent "persons." 
Secondly, if independent "persons" share in the ownership of the 
"subsidiary," then a conspiracy might be found among the two or 
more independent persons holding the shares. The conspiracy could 
relate to the purpose in forming the subsidiary, if the others join in 
forming it, or to agreements and arrangements among the independent 
shareholders with respect to the operations of the jointly owned cor-
poration. Both of these problems were present in Timken. 
Because these two factors provide a basis for liability that is 
independent of a theory of intra-enterprise conspiracy, the parent-
subsidiary organization considered throughout this Note is assumed 
to be one in which the subsidiaries were organized and created solely 
by the parent, and were not formed through merger or acquisition, 
or otherwise in cooperation with others. It is also assumed that the 
subsidiary is either wholly or substantially owned by the parent, with 
the minority owners holding only for investment. These assumptions 
eliminate the risk that a conspiracy can be found among "persons" 
other than the parent and the subsidiary corporations and allow a 
direct consideration of the implications of a theory of intra-enterprise 
conspiracy. 36 
Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, lnc.31 was the 
first major case in which the subsidiaries were indeed internally 
created and wholly owned. Kiefer-Stewart Co., an Indiana liquor 
wholesaler, brought a treble damage action against Joseph E. Seagram 
& Sons, Inc. (Seagram), two wholly owned subsidiaries of Seagram 
( Seagram Sales and Calvert), and a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Calvert ( Calvert Sales). 38 The complaint alleged that Seagram and 
Calvert had conspired in violation of the Sherman Act by agreeing 
to sell their products only to Indiana wholesalers who would resell 
at prices fixed by the defendants. 39 
demands of a business growing as a result of superior and enterprising management, 
[and those created] by deliberate, calculated purchase for control." 332 U.S. at 
227-28, quoting United States v. Reading Co., 253 U.S. 26, 57 (1920). 
36. Such assumptions are generally made by others. See, e.g., ATTORNEY GEN-
ERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 30 n.106; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 
8, at 22. 
37. 340 U.S. 211 (1951). 
38. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., was in turn a subsidiary of Distiller Corpo-
ration Seagram Ltd., a Canadian corporation, which was not a party to the suit. 
See Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 182 F.2d 228, 229 (7th 
Cir. 1950). 
39. 340 U.S. at 212. On certiorari the major point considered was whether a 
conspiracy or agreement to fix maximum (rather than minimum) resale prices vio-
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As a defense to the conspiracy charge, the defendants urged that 
"their status as 'mere instrumentalities of a single manufacturer-mer-
chandizing unit' [made] it impossible for them to have conspired 
in a manner forbidden by the Sherman Act."40 The Court, however, 
rejected this argument: 
Seagram and Calvert acting individually perhaps might have 
refused to deal with petitioner or with any or all of the Indiana whole-
salers .... 
But this suggestion [that their status was as a single business unit, 
incapable of conspiring,] runs counter to our past decisions that com-
mon ownership and control does not liberate corporations from the 
impact of the antitrust laws. E. g. United States v. Yellow Cab Co. 
. . . The rule is especially applicable where, as here, respondents 
hold themselves out as competitors.41 
Thus, solely on .the basis of Yellow Cab, which has been shown to 
be questionable authority,42 the Court upheld in one brief paragraph 
the proposition that affiliates in a parent-subsidiary organization can 
conspire. 
In two early cases, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
read Kiefer-Stewart expansively to support the conclusion that agree-
ments or discussions among parent and subsidiary corporations, 
followed by concerted action, could constitute a conspiracy.43 Many 
commentators, however, have criticized this finding and noted the 
feebleness of its theoretical support. 44 They have suggested that 
the requisite plurality was, or could have been, found in vertical 
agreements between the members of the Seagram enterprise and the 
independent wholesalers. 45 
lated section 1. The Court held that such an arrangement did violate section 1. 
340 U.S. at 213, revg. 182 F.2d 228 (7th Cir. 1950). 
40. 340 U.S. at 215. The issue of whether the wholly owned subsidiaries could 
conspire with one another or with the parent had not been decided by the lower 
courts. The parties presented it to the Court, however, and, because it was a ques-
tion of law, the Court considered it. See Stengel, supra note 8, at 14. 
41. 340 U.S. at 214-15. 
42. See text at notes 18-24 supra. 
43. In the most expansive application of the Court's implication the Federal Trade 
Commission instituted two actions that resulted in consent decrees barring agree-
ments as to price among affiliates in two parent-subsidiary organizations. In 
neither case did the FfC charge that other "persons" outside of the corporate family 
were involved in the alleged conspiracy. See Distillers Corp.-Seagrams, Ltd., 50 
F.T.C. 738 (1954); Schenley Indus., Inc., 50 F.T.C. 747 (1954); Note, supra note 
8, at 383-84. 
44. See, e.g., McQuade, supra note 8, at 206-07; Stengel, supra note 8, at 14. 
45. See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 45. The argument is that the Seagram 
enterprise was not protected by the doctrine developed in United States v. Colgate 
& Co., 250 U.S. 373 (1911), because its activities involved more than unilateral 
action. In Colgate, the Supreme Court refused to find a plurality of actors in a 
resale price maintenance scheme. Instead, it rejected the existence of a section 1 
violation by claiming that the scheme had been unilaterally adopted and policed by 
the defendant manufacturer. However, this suggested explanation of Kief er-Stewart 
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The most recent case in which the Supreme Court has considered 
the intra-enterprise conspiracy question is Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. 
v. International Parts Corp.46 The plaintiffs, dealers who had oper-
ated "Midas Muffler Shops," alleged that International Parts Corp. 
and three of its internally created and wholly owned subsidiaries had 
conspired to fix retail prices and ;to require exclusive dealing. The 
· lower courts47 had found for defendants on the basis of an in pari 
delicto defense48 and alternatively on the theory that the various 
concerns, "while operated through a multi-corporate structure, [were] 
a single business entity . . . and that, therefore, as a matter of 
law, no conspiracy existed among them in violation of Section 
1 . . . ."40 
Justice Black, writing for the Court, first rejected the in pari delicto 
defense, 50 and then, in one brief paragraph, citing Timken and 
.Yellow Cab, also reversed the lower courts' holding that the separate 
corporations were a single business entity, incapable of conspiring: 
"[S]ince respondents Midas and International availed themselves 
of the privilege of doing business ,through separate corporations, the 
fact of common ownership could not save them from any of the obli-
gations that the law imposes on separate entities."51 
Although one noted commentator has interpreted this to be an 
unequivocal commitment of the Court to the proposition that the 
fact of separate corporate identities allows a finding of conspiracy 
among affiliates in a parent-subsidiary organization, 52 the decision 
need not be interpreted so broadly. It is important to recognize that 
the Court did not have to reach the intra-enterprise conspiracy 
issue. The franchise agreements executed between Midas and the 
various plaintiffs explicitly carried the -resale price fixing, exclusive 
dealing, and tying provisions. 53 Such provisions in the franchise con-
is not entirely compelling. While United'States v. Parke, Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 
29 (1960), and Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968), support the argument, 
they were decided nine and seventeen years later, respectively. Thus, in order for 
the suggested argument to be persuasive, Kiefer-Stewart must have presaged this later 
erosion of the Colgate doctrine. 
46. 392 U.S. 134 (1968). 
47. 1966 Trade Cas. 82,704 (N.D. Ill. 1966), aftd., 376 F.2d 692 (7th Cir. 
1967). 
48. 376 F.2d 692, 699 (7th Cir. 1967). 
49. 1966 Trade Cas. at 82,707. The district court further held: 
There is no evidence, except in plaintiffs' unsupported arguments that these 
corporations competed with each other or acted in any manner other than as a 
single integrated business. There are no acts alleged which could not have been 
done by a single corporation acting alone. Plaintiffs may not by mere pleading 
allegations and conclusions fragmentize a unified business to meet the conspiracy 
requirements of the Sherman Act. 
1966 Trade Cas. at 82,707. 
50. 392 U.S. at 139. 
51. 392 U.S. at 141-42. 
52. See Handler, supra note 8, at 183. 
53. 392 U.S. at 136-37. 
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tracts, executed by obviously distinct entities, were sufficient to 
satisfy the "contract, combination . . . or conspiracy" requirement 
of section 1. 54 Therefore, a determination against the in pari delicto 
defense was dispositive of the case. It was for this reason that the 
concurring opinions did not have to agree with Justice Black on the 
intra-enterprise conspiracy; indeed, none of the five Justices writing 
separate opinions even discussed the theory.55 By their language, 
the concurring 9pinions appear to have taken the view that the 
section 1 violation rested on the franchise agreement between the 
opposing parties rather than on a conspiracy among the defendants. 56 
Even Justice Black recognized this other basis for meeting the plu-
rality requirement of section 1. 57 His comment "that in any event 
[there were several] alternative theories of conspiracy"08 indicates, 
perhaps, a discomfort with his broad language on intra-enterprise 
conspiracy.59 At the very least, it permitted Justice Black to reach 
the ultimate result without a full exposition of the issue. 
Although some have interpreted the cases discussed above as sup-
port for an expansive theory of intra-enterprise conspiracy, this Note 
has so far shown that such a doctrine was not needed to find the 
plurality required for a conspiracy under section 1. In Y el/ow Cab 
and Timken, a conspiracy of independent persons preceded the com-
bination that .the defendants argued was a parent-subsidiary organi-
zation. In Kiefer-Stewart, the decision most strongly supporting an 
implication of intra-enterprise conspiracy, the alleged conspirators 
were indeed wholly owned affiliates of a common parent, but it has 
54. See Handler, supra note 8, at 187. 
55. Justice White concurred in the opinion, Justices Fortas and Marshall con-
curred in the result, and J1.Jstice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, concurred in part 
and dissented in part. Although Justice White claimed to join the opinion of the 
Court, 392 U.S. at 142, his separate opinion indicates that, unlike Justice Black, 
he did not see the section 1 violation as resting on the alleged intra-enterprise con-
spiracy. See note 56 infra. 
56. Their four separate opinions make it clear that Justices White, Fortas, 
Marshall, Harlan and Stewart did not view the section 1 violation as resting on 
an intra-enterprise conspiracy but rather on the "arrangement" or "agreement" be-
tween the plaintiffs and the defendant enterprise. For example, Justice White saw 
the violation as an "illegal arrangement" between the petitioners and respondents. 
392 U.S. at 143. Before posing the hypotheticals intended to clarify his position 
on the in pari de/icto question, he stated the issue as "what is the situation when 
one party to the combination sues the other." 392 U.S. at 144. Justice Fortas recog-
nized that the violation rested on particular clauses "of the Agreement." 392 U.S. 
at 148. According to Justice Marshall, the violation of section 1 was based on the 
franchise agreement. 392 U.S. at 149-50. Justice Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, 
also considered the violation to rest on the "agreement" between the opposing parties. 
392 U.S. at 156. 
I 
57. Justice Black stated that "each petitioner can clearly charge a combination 
between Midas and himself, as of the day he unwillingly complied with . • . the 
agreements." 392 U.S. at 142. 
58. 392 U.S. at 142. 
59. See Kempf, supra note 8, at 176. 
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been argued that section 1 liability could have rested upon the verti-
cal agreements between the enterprise and independent whole-
salers. 00 Finally, in Perma Life, the Court spoke only in conclusory 
terms with no analysis of the issue and' itself recognized an alter-
native basis for its holding. The next section of this Note explores 
the practical and theoretical difficulties of such an expansive theory 
of conspiracy. 
Il. CRITICISMS OF AN EXPANSIVE THEORY OF CONSPIRACY 
Application of a theory of conspiracy to arrangements among 
separately incorporated affiliates in a parent-subsidiary organization 
might be reasonable if such arrangements engendered particular 
antitrust problems, but they do not. 61 As already noted, 62 it is 
settled law that directors, officers, employees, or divisions within a 
single corporation, when acting in behalf of the enterprise, are not 
deemed to conspire either with the corporation or with one another 
in violation of section 1. 63 As some critics have pointed out, to 
find a conspiracy between separate corporations of a multi-corporate 
enterprise, when one cannot be found between functionally similar, 
separate divisions of a single corporation, is to exalt form over sub-
stance, 64 and, perhaps, to substitute convenience for logical analysis. 
As a practical matter, antitrust enforcement under an expansive 
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine would make conduct taking 
place in almost every parent-subsidiary organization illegitimate. 
Any discussions, agreements, or coordinated actions65 with respect 
to pricing, market or customer allocation, or a host of other issues, 
could result in a finding of conspiracy. 66 Given such a finding, 
60. See note 45 supra. 
61. Willis & Pitofsky argue that the expansive intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine 
is being used to fill perceived "gaps" between sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 
They claim that the acceptance of this doctrine is not the appropriate method to 
remedy such inadequacies in the Sherman Act. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 
8, at 28-30. Handler concurs with this view: "One looks in vain in Perma Life 
or in any of the cases on which it relies for any policy justifying a doctrine which 
on its face is repugnant to common sense. Certainly the use of corporate subsidiaries 
offends no recognized antitrust policy." Handler, supra note 8, at 187. 
62. See text at note 2 supra. 
63. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 
416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970); Nelson Radio 
& Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 
U.S. 925 (1953). 
64. Ironically, the Court has asserted that substance should prevail over form 
in this area of the law. See United States v. Yellow Cab Co., 332 U.S. 218, 227 
(1947). 
65. The Supreme Court has indicated that coordinated action can support a find-
ing that there was a tacit agreement and, therefore, a conspiracy. See, e.g., Interstate 
Circuit, Inc. v. United States, 306 U.S. 208, 226-27 (1939). 
66. Discussions among affiliates in a parent-subsidiary enterprise would certainly 
support a finding of conspiracy under an expansive intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
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coupled with per se rules against such activities as price fixing or 
market 11llocation, most parent-subsidiary enterprises would be in 
continuous violation of the Sherman Act. 
Yet there are many legitimate reasons why an enterprise might 
structure its business in the form of a parent corporation with sepa-
rately incorporated subsidiaries. Operating a multi-corporate struc-
ture--as opposed to conducting business through distinct divisions 
of a single corporate entity-may, through decentralization, achieve 
efficiencies in production, distribution, or management;67 may main-
tain the good will associated with a particular part of the over-all 
enterprise; may increase the marketability on the capital markets 
of a particular aspect of the enterprise;68 or may avoid disadvantages 
of operating in a particular area as a foreign corporation. 00 Thus, 
especially with the loss of tax advantages, 70 a multi-corporate or-
ganization may attain some "real" efficiencies71 that, in the aggregate, 
are beneficial to society. Hence, because the motives for such busi-
ness decisions may be totally independent of any antitrust concern, 
trine. As Justice Douglas stated: "It is not necessary to find an express agreement 
in order to find a conspiracy. It is enough that a concert of action is contemplated 
and the defendants conformed to the arrangement." United States v. Paramount 
Pictures, 334 U.S. 131, 142 (1948). 
67. Such efficiencies may arise simply from the creation or maintenance of esprit 
de corps resulting from the mere fact of separateness in corporate form. See Willis 
& Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 28. 
68. Separate incorporation may enable the firm to attract more easily equity or 
debt financing. Furthermore, it may create a more fluid market for the possible 
transfer of a component of an enterprise. Id. at 27-28. 
69. See, e.g., Interstate Transit Lines v. Commissioner, 319 U.S. 590 ( 1943) (Ne-
braska corporation created California subsidiary to avoid state law restricting intra-
state transportation business to California corporations). For a discussion of such 
problems in foreign commerce, see the arguments made by Timken in Timken Roller 
Bearing Co. v. United States, 341 U.S. 593 (1951). 
70. Whereas formerly a primary reason for separate incorporation was the tax 
benefits that were gained thereby, the 1969 amendments to the Internal Revenue 
Code substantially eliminated these advantages. See Wilberding, An Ominous Warn-
ing for the Antitrust Law: The Disposition of the "Bathtub" Conspiracy-as Applied 
to Unincorporated Divisions-May Have Left a Tell-Tale Ring Around the Tub, 
32 OHIO ST. L.J. 43, 47 (1971), which notes that the advantages of the multiple 
surtax exemption and the ability to reduce exposure to the unreasonable accumula-
tions tax for amounts accruing to a multi-corporate enterprise were largely elimi-
nated by the provisions of the 1969' tax amendments. 
71. "Real" efficiencies is used here in its economic sense to mean resource sav-
ings. For example, in the short run, income tax advantages of a multi-corporate 
organization that arose prior to 1969 resulted solely in an allocation of funds between 
the enterprise and the government. The tax savings here are only a financial advan-
tage for the enterprise, not a "real" efficiency. The same holds true for the benefit 
of limited liability achieved through separate incorporation. Advantages resulting 
from a multi-corporate form that create cost savings, such as managerial efficiencies, 
are "real" efficiencies, in that the same "goods" are being produced with fewer re-
sources. The ability to enter a foreign market through a subsidiary, see note 69 
supra, presumably increases economic efficiency and benefits the public by facilitat-
ing the transfer of resources to increase competition in an activity from which above-
normal profit is presently being earned. 
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the multi-corporate form does not necessarily raise any unique anti-
trust issue that cannot be reached by substantive doctrines other than 
an expansive intra-enterprise conspiracy theory.72 Courts should be 
reluctant to apply a broad rule that not only might inhibit the achieve-
ment of real efficiencies but also might, in fact, fail to further any 
antitrust policy. 
Despite, or perhaps because of, the wide potential for applying 
a theory of intra-enterprise conspiracy, both antitrust enforcement 
agencies and the courts have been reluctant to rely on the theory. 
Except for two early actions,73 the FTC has not charged an enter-
prise with illegal conspiracy based solely on internal discussions or 
agreements. 74 Leading officials of the Antitrust Division have also 
recently counseled hesitation in applying such a theory75 and, in fact, 
the Justice Department has "never brought an action against a parent 
and its subsidiary corporations . . . charging a conspiracy solely in 
restraint of the trade of the affiliated defendants."76 This position 
is also evident in many consent decrees which, by their terms, do 
not apply to activities among affiliates in a parent-subsidiary organi-
zation. 77 
The Supreme Court itself has contradicted the broad conspiracy 
implication often drawn from Yellow Cab, Kiefer-Stewart, and 
Timken. In Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith Citrus 
Products Co.,78 a decision preceding Perma Life, the Court refused 
to find a conspiracy among Sunkist, its wholly owned subsidiary Ex-
change Orange, and Exchange Lemon, the members of which all be-
longed to the Sunkist organization. Writing for a unanimous Court, 
Justice Clark stated: 
We are squarely presented, then, with the question of whether Sun-
kist, Exchange Orange, and Exchange Lemon-the three legal en-
tities formed by these 12,000 growers-can be considered indepen-
72. The claim that the obligations of separateness must be accepted if one has 
availed himself "of the privilege of doing business through separate corporations," 
Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 141-42 (1968), 
again exalts form over substance. Conspiracy liability should result from the mere 
fact of separate incorporation of parent and subsidiary firms, given its structural 
advantages, only if it raises peculiar antitrust problems. See note 61 supra. 
73. See note 43 supra and accompanying text. 
74. See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 31-32. 
15. Id. Shortly after he took office as Assistant Attorney General for the Anti-
trust Division, Donald· Turner claimed that the Department of Justice would not 
press the Court's language in Timken to its full implications: "[W]e should not 
press to the limits afforded by past decisions wherever on present evaluation those 
decisions appear to have gone too far. We should not, for example, attempt to push 
the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine as far as a free-wheeling interpretation of the 
Timken case might suggest." 10 ANTITRUST BULL. 685, 687 (1965). 
76. ATI0RNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 34. See Willis 
& Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 30. 
77. See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 30 n.32. 
78. 370 U.S. 19 (1962). 
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dent parties for the purposes of the conspiracy provisions of § § 1 
and 2 of the Sherman Act. We conclude not. . . . 
. . . [W]e feel that the 12,000 growers here involved are in prac-
ical effect and in the contemplation of the statutes one "organiza-
tion" or "association" even though they have formally organized 
themselves into three separate legal entities. To hold otherwise 
would be to impose grave legal consequences upon organizational 
distinctions that are of de minimis meaning and effect . . . . 70 
The Court looked at the substance of the arrangement80 and de-
clined to find a conspiracy based on the mere fact that the parent 
and its subsidiaries were formally separate entities. 81 
Thus, Sunkist contradicts the broad theory of intra-enterprise con-
spiracy that may be implied by earlier decisions. Unfortunately, in 
Perma Life, neither the majority opinion of Justice Black nor the 
separate opinions addressed this contradiction or attempted to recon-
cile Sunkist with the conclusory language of Perma Li/ e. 82 It thus 
appears that the Supreme Court itself may have provided au-
thority for rejecting the validity of intra-enterprise conspiracy and has 
at least been equivocal about its application; the results of Sunkist 
and Perma Life surely suggest that other factors may be isolated to 
provide a basis for distinguishing these cases. 
Lower courts have also hesitated to find a conspiracy among firms 
in a parent-subsidiary enterprise merely because of their separate in-
corporation. 83 For example, in I. Haas Trucking Corp. v. New York 
79. 370 U.S. at 29. Although the exemptions granted to agricultural coopera-
tives by section 6 of the Clayton Antitrust Act, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1970), and the 
Capper-Volstead Act of 1922, 7 U.S.C. § 291 (1970), played a part in the decision, 
they were not controlling, and the holding is not so limited. The Court's language 
quoted in the text applies to any parent-subsidiary enterprise and indicates, as this 
Note has argued, that substance rather than mere form is the key factor in judging 
whether an intra-enterprise arrangement violates section 1. For support of this view 
that the Court's reasoning is applicable to the general intra-enterprise conspiracy 
question, see Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635, 640-41 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 
discussed in text at notes 147-53 infra; Kempf, supra note 8, at 180; Stengel, supra 
note 8, at 20; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 38 n.59. 
80. ''There is no indication that the use of separate corporations had economic 
significance in itself or that outsiders considered and dealt with the three entities 
as independent organizations." 370 U.S. at 29. 
81. 370 U.S. at 29. 
82. See text at note 51 supra. 
83. I. Haas Trucking Corp. v. New York Fruit Auction Corp., 364 F. Supp. 868 
(S.D.N .Y. 1973), discussed in text at notes 84-87 infra, indicates that lower courts 
have not extended the language of the Supreme Court in Perma Life to its full impli-
cation. For other cases in which courts have refused to find a conspiracy based 
on the mere fact of separate incorporation of the parent and its subsidiaries, see 
REA Express Inc. v. Alabama Great S. Ry., 1976-7 Trade Cas. 70,326 (S.D.N.Y. 
1976); Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Co., 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Call Carl, 
Inc. v. B.P. Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568 (D. Md. 1975); Chastain v. American 
Tel. & Tel. Co., 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975); Penn Cent. Sec. v. Pennsylvania 
Co., 367 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Beckman v, Walter Kidde Co., 316 F. 
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Fruit Auction Corp.,84 the New York Fruit Auction Corporation 
(Auction) organized a subsidiary to take over functions in the fruit 
auction business that had been performed inefficiently by the plain-
tiff and other independent firms. 85 The district court refused to 
accept the contention that the defendants-,Auction and its subsid-
iary-could be found to conspire: 
For the purposes of Section 1, the two defendants must properly 
be regarded as a single entity-and therefore incapable as a matter 
of law, of concerted activity, conspiracy or contracting with each 
other . . . . They are clearly parts of an integral operation, so uni-
fied that they cannot be regarded as separate in any but the most 
perfunctory and technical manner.86 
This language clearly rejects a broad application of an intra-enter-
prise conspiracy doctrine. 87 
Thus, the positions of antitrust enforcement agencies and of the 
courts themselves indicate that the doctrine of intra-enterprise con-
spiracy is not seen as definitive law and that its broad, literal appli-
cation to all parent-subsidiary relationships is clearly viewed as in-
appropriate. The following section analyzes previously proposed 
theories for limiting the scope of this doctrine. 
Ill. PREVIOUSLY PROPOSED LIMITATIONS 
Some writers have· argued that an intra-enterprise conspiracy can 
exist only when arrangements or agreements among affiliates have 
the purpose or effect of a restraint of trade on outsiders, 88 while 
others have contended that affiliates in a parent-subsidiary organi-
zation can conspire only when they hold themselves out as competi-
tors. 89 It is submitted here that neither of these theories is accept-
Supp. 1321 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, while 
equivocal on the issue, has not accepted the Supreme Court's broad implication. See 
Tribwasser & Katz v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 1976-7 Trade Cas. 60,888, 68,870 
(2d Cir. 1976). 
Of course, there are cases that follow the expansive implications of Perma Life. 
See, e.g., Cromar Co. v. Nuclear Materials & Equip. Corp., 543 F.2d 501 (3d Cir. 
1976); George R. Whitten, Jr., Inc. v. Paddock Pool Builders, Inc., 424 F.2d 25 
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1970); Dobbins v. Kawasaki Motors Corp., 
362 F. Supp. 54 (D. Ore. 1973); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit 
Co., 358 F. Supp. 780 (S.D. Tex. 1971) (dictum). 
84. 364 F. Supp. 8.68 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). 
85. 364 F. Supp. at 870-72. 
86. 364 F. Supp. at 873. 
87. The Haas Trucking case presents a concrete example of the formation of 
a subsidiary for valid business purposes unrelated to any antitrust concern. Rather 
than being organized as a division, the subsidiary was separately incorporated be-
cause the employees of the two firms belonged to separate labor unions and enjoyed 
'different fringe benefits. 364 F. Supp. at 873. 
88. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 34. 
89. See Willis & ;(>itofsky, supra note 8, at 36-38. Some commentators suggest 
that courts should reject the application of per se rules to agreements among affili-
ates in a parent-subsidiary organization and instead apply a rule of reason standard 
to such arrangements. See, e.g., E. KINTNER, AN AN'ITTiluST PRIMER 29 (2d ed. 
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able and that an alternative doctrine, proposed in the final section 
of this Note, should be recognized as the appropriate theory of intra-
enterprise conspiracy. 
A. The "External Effect" Theory 
One theory limiting the Cour-t's implication of intra-enterprise 
conspiracy was proposed in the highly regarded report of the United 
States Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust 
Laws. The Committee recognized the dangers of such a broad 
conspiracy theory and argued that "[t]o demand internal compe-
tition within and between the member of a single business unit is to 
invite chaos without promotion of the public welfare."00 Thus 
the Committee interpreted the opinions of the Supreme Court 
narrowly: 
The substance of the Supreme Court decisions is that concerted 
action between a parent and subsidiary or between subsidiaries which 
has for its purpose or effect coercion or unreasonable restraint on the 
trade of strangers to those acting in concert is prohibited by Section 
1. Nothing in these opinions should be interpreted as justifying the 
conclusion that concerted action solely between a parent and sub-
sidiary or subsidiaries, the purpose and effect of which is not coer-
cive restraint of the trade of strangers to the corporate family, vio-
lates Section 1. 01 
Based on this interpretation of the Court's opinions, a majority of the 
Committee went on to "disapprove any application of this doctrine 
to joint action between members of a corporate family not intended 
to or resulting in coercive undue restraint on their customers or com-
petitors. "92 
In the statements quoted above, the Committee used the words 
"purpose" and "effect." However, it did not explain how these con-
cepts might be the basis for an effective and meaningful limitation 
on the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. It is especially unclear 
how a standard that is based upon the enterprise's "purpose" can 
add much to the prohibitory scope of the antitrust statutes. Pur-
poseful predatory conduct is, after all, already covered by the doc-
trines developed from the attempt to monopolize language of section 
2 of the Sherman Act, where "purpose" plays a dominant role. 93 
1973 ); Comment, Corporate Liability for Intra-Corporate Conspiracy in Restraint 
of Trade, 1968 U. ILL. L.F. 248, 253 (1968). Although this proposal addresses 
the problem created by the Court's broad implication in Per ma Life, it does so from 
a different perspective. This approach assumes that affiliates can be found to con-
spire and merely proposes that such "conspiracies" be judged by a rule of reason. 
90. ATTORNEY GENERAL'S COMMITTEE REPORT, supra note 23, at 34-35. 
91. Id. at 34 (emphasis added). 
92. Id. at 34. 
93. See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 40-41. Willis and Pitofsky suggest 
that the predatory intent that the Attorney General's Committee considers crucial 
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Whereas the intra-enterprise conspiracy theory is designed to satisfy 
the plurality requirement of section 1, plurality is not at issue in sec-
tion 2; an attempt to monopolize does not require a multiplicity of 
actors. 
On the other hand, many commentators have focused solely upon 
the "effect" concept. 94 The Committee apparently thought that an 
intra-enterprise conspiracy could be found in cases in which an 
agreement or arrangement among the parent and subsidiaries had 
an effect upon outsiders. But this theory seems unworkable, for it 
is likely that every significant intra-enterprise arrangement has some 
external effects. Illustrative are the common arrangements among 
parents and subsidiaries to set prices or to allocate territories and 
products among the firms within the organization. If taken literally, 
the external-effect test could make these and possibly all other such 
arrangements illegal. This result hardly constitutes the limitation on 
the intra-enterprise conspiracy theory sought by the Committee itself. 
The real problem, of course, is to develop principled standards that 
can distinguish between innocent effects ( or a lack of any effects) 
Oill the one hand, and substantial effects-sufficient to trigger a 
finding of conspiracy-on the other.95 Yet proponents of the test 
have suggested no such standard that would provide the lower cour:ts 
with a principled basis for determining liability. The external-effect 
test is thus untenable because its results are unpredictable and because 
it would condemn virtually all intra-enterprise decisionmaking to unac-
ceptable uncertainty. 
This lack of a principle by which to assess liability is evident in 
Chastain v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.96 The district 
court considered whether AT&T (the parent) and its various oper-
ating subsidiaries conspired in violation of section 1 in refusing to 
provide services to plaintiffs, distributors of mobile telephones. The 
court did not apply the broad theory of intra-enterprise conspiracy 
suggested by the Supreme Court97 but rather seemed to accept the 
to a finding of conspiracy is really a matter of concern under section 2 of the Sher-
man Act. An anticompetitive intent to harm outsiders would be an "attempt to 
monopolize" violation under section 2 rather than an intra-enterprise conspiracy. 
94. See, e.g., McQuade, supra note 8, at 213; Stengel, supra note 8, at 22-23; 
Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 48-49. 
95. See McQuade, supra note 8, at 213; Stengel, supra note 8, at 22-23; Willis 
& Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 48-49. Stengel observed: 
Such a distinction would be meaningless because it could always be shown 
that the trade of outsiders was restrained. Any agreement between members of 
a corporate family with respect to prices, division of markets, and such, would 
obviously affect the trade of customers and competitors. Therefore, restricting 
the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine to cases in which there is external re-
straint would create an illusory limitation. 
Stengel, supra note 8, at 22-23. 
96. 401 F. Supp. 151 (D.D.C. 1975). 
91. See 401 F. Supp. at 160. 
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analysis of the Attorney General's Committee. 98 The court stated: 
The cases in the last two categories mentioned [one where a con-
spiracy was found and the other where it was not] suggest what seems 
to ,this court the proper -approach to the intra-corporate conspiracy 
issue. In those cases the courts decided whether or not to treat the 
defendant companies as conspirators only after determining, on the 
basis of all the facts, whether the companies' actions amounted to, 
in purpose and effect, a conspiracy in restraint of trade.00 
The court articulated no standard for assessing when parent-subsid-
iary agreements-which commonly are designed to achieve some 
measure of competitive advantage and will almost always affect 
outsiders-transgress the bounds of legality. In essence, the lan-
guage quoted above implies that a conspiracy will be found when 
the court thinks one should be found. The "effect" theory, as it 
is currently expounded, .thus fails to provide a sound principle upon 
which to rest a rule of law. 
B. The "Holding Out" Theory 
The most influential theory for limiting application of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine was proposed by Everett Willis and 
Robert Pitofsky.100 This theory draws upon Justice Black's opinion 
in Kiefer-Stewart: "[C]ommon ownership and control does not 
liberate corporations from the impact of the antitrust laws. . . . The 
rule is especially applicable where . . . respondents hold themselves 
out as competitors."101 The proponents of this "holding out" theory 
extend this proposition and claim that an intra-enterprise conspiracy 
should only be found in cases, like Kiefer-Stewart, in which two or. 
more corporations in a parent-subsidiary enterprise publicly adopt a 
competitive posture vis-a-vis one another.102 Some lower courts 
have apparently accepted this theory, although its application has 
been primarily used ito limit, rather than to support, application of 
the conspiracy doctrine.103 
98. See 401 F. Supp. at 159-60. The court, like the Attorney General's Commit-
tee, expressed willingness to find a conspiracy where there was predatory purpose 
or intent underlying actions directed at outsiders. See 401 F. Supp. at 159 n.35. 
99. 401 F. Supp. at 160 (emphasis added). 
100. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 35-38. 
101. Kiefer-Stewart Co. v.. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 340 U.S. 211, 215 
(1951). 
102. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 35-38. The exception to this general 
rule is that a conspiracy can be found; as in the Yellow Cab case, where the enter-
-p-rise chooses to do business through corporate components with the specific intent 
of achieving some anticompetitive result. Id. at 35. 
103. See, e.g., Call Carl, Inc. v. B.P. Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 572 (D. 
Md. 1975); Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (E.D.N.Y. 
1970). In a recent case, the Supreme Court suggested that it may accept this lunita-
tion. See United States v. Citizens & S. Natl. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975). But 
see text at notes 131-41 infra. · 
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The "holding out" theory is deficient in two respects. First, the 
elements of behavior that constitute "holding out" have never been 
precisely delineated. Justice Black merely stated his conclusion in 
Kief er-Stewart with no analysis, while lower courts claiming to accept 
the "holding out" limitation have done so only in dicta.104 If the 
subsidiaries in Kiefer-Stewart are to serve as the paradigm, then 
presumably "holding out" is present when affiliated firms separately 
market and pr9mote products that appear, in the public's view, 
competitive with one another. 
If this is the appropriate situation for the application of the 
"holding out" theory, then it exposes a more fundamental defect in 
the theory: the lack of a clear relationship of such a factual pattern 
to antitrust concerns. Indeed, Willis and Pitofsky recognize this lack 
of theoretical justification in Kiefer-Stewart: · · 
[T]here is no indication in the opinion as to why affiliated companies 
holding themselves ou"t as competitors should incur additional anti-
trust liability. The Supreme Court may have had some concept of 
estoppel in mind, but ordinarily an estoppel doctrine requires a finding 
that someone relying on appearances changed his position to his dis-
advantage. There is no indication in the Supreme Court opinion 
that anyone relied to his disadvantage on the apparent fact that Cal-
vert and Seagram were competitors.105 
Thus, there appears to be no identifiable antitrust significance in 
the mere fact that affiliates of a multi-firm enterprise hold them-
selves out as competitors. The only apparent justification for the 
theory is that the "holding out" language in Kiefer-Stewart provides 
a convenient method to limit the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. 
Limitation is indeed a desirable objective, but it should be achieved 
in a manner consistent with the basic purposes of the antitrust laws 
and not by means of an unreasoned, and hence arbitrary, formula. 
The next section of this Note proposes an alternative theory of limi-
tation that actually subsumes any reasoned principles -that might sup-
port the "holding out" theory.106 
JV. A PROPOSED THEORY OF LIMITATION 
In this section, a new theory of limitation is proposed that focuses 
upon the degree of managerial control the parent exercises over its 
subsidiary. It will be shown that such an approach is consistent both 
with Supreme Court pronouncements and with sound antitrust policy, 
and that lower courts have applied a similar approach. 
The proposed theory of limitation is as follows: If a parent firm 
controls the day-to-day operations of its subsidiaries, a conspiracy 
104. See, e.g., Call Carl, Inc. v. B.P. Oil Corp., 403 F. Supp. 568, 572 (D. Md. 
1975); Beckman v. Walter Kidde & Co., 316 F. Supp. 1321, 1325 (E.D.N.Y. 1970). 
105. Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 37 (emphasis added). 
106. See text at notes 130-31 infra. 
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should not be found on the basis of agreements107 or coordinated 
activity among them.108 Even though a fictional plurality exists in 
separate corporate identities, a multi-corporate enterprise that is 
integrated with the parent exercising control should be viewed as 
"one mind," whose various parts are incapable of conspiring with 
one another. This proposal is designed to create a "safe-harbor" 
rule within which intra-enterprise relations will not be subject to lia-
bility for conspiracy under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 100 
The analysis suggested by this theory is reasonable on several 
grounds, two of which have been presented in previous sections. 
First, an enterprise with subsidiaries controlled by -the parent does 
not differ functionally or substantively from a single corporation with 
distinct divisions. 110 Since a finding of conspiracy among separate 
divisions of a single corporation has never been upheld, 111 it exalts 
form over substance to subject tightly controlled corporations within 
a single enterprise to antitrust liability solely because they are for-
mally separate.112 Secondly, the parent-subsidiary organization 
raises no special antitrust concerns peculiar to that form of enter-
prise; indeed, as argued above, there may be valid business reasons 
for a company to structure itself along these lines. 113 Allowing a 
107. However, an explicit contract between the managements of the parent and 
subsidiary may suggest that the parent does not control the day-to-day operations 
of the subsidiary. See note 118 infra. 
108. Again it is assumed that the parent created the subsidiaries and the latter 
either are wholly owned by the parent or are substantially owned by the parent 
with minority owners holding only for investment. This assumption eliminates the 
possibility of a conspiracy of the nature discussed in text at notes 35-36 supra. 
109. This Note only suggests the factual situations that should not support a 
finding of an intra-enterprise conspiracy and thus does not analyze whether a con-
spiracy should be found in other circumstances. In essence, this Note offers a "safe-
harbor" rule. In contrast, Willis and Pitofsky propose a general rule that states 
that affiliates ,in a parent-subsidiary enterprise cannot be found to conspire with each 
other. They offer the "holding out" and "anticompetitive intent" theories as limited 
exceptions to their general rule. See Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 35. Thus, 
the theory proposed in this Note suggests a situation where a conspiracy should not 
be found, while Willis and Pitofsky suggest exceptional circumstances which would 
support a finding of conspiracy. 
110. See text at notes 61-64 supra. 
111. See, e.g., Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 
416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970). 
112. In Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 272 
F. Supp. 915 (D. Hawaii 1967), revd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 
396 U.S. 1062 (1970), the Ninth Circuit reversed a trial court holding that, because 
Seagrams restructured itself merely to avoid the result that had occurred in Kiefer-
Stewart, and because the substance of the organization had not changed, the distinct 
divisions could be found to have conspired with each other. 
11~. See notes 67-72 supra and accompanying text. The contrary theory, an-
nounced by Justice Black in Perma Life, is that because a parent-subsidiary enterprise 
gains some benefits from such organization, such as limited liability for each firm, 
it must as well accept any resulting costs, which in this context would include the 
ability of its constituent parts to conspire with one another. 392 U.S. at 142. How-
ever, this analysis simply begs the question. The real issue, is after all, whether 
mere separate incorporation should be enough to support a finding of conspiracy. 
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finding of conspiracy among affiliated firms when the parent controls 
the operations of the subsidiaries would likely discourage firms from 
seeking the socially beneficial advantages that can be achieved with 
this form of organization. 
Although the full contours of an intra-enterprise conspiracy doc-
trine under section 1 of the Sherman Act remain subject to 
debate, 114 its scope clearly should not extend to the proposed "safe-
harbor." A standard based upon day-to-day control is consistent 
with the central purpose of section 1 of the Sherman Act, which is 
to prohibit concelll:ed action among two or more independent enti-
ties.116 While section 2 of the Act controls undesirable single-firm 
size and power, 116 the conspiracy element of section 1 prohibits 
arrangements and agreements that reduce the competitive forces 
among the conspiring firms. Section 1, then, is concerned with pre-
venting a reduction in the number of units with market discretion. 
Underlying this purpose is the expectation fl\at rthe more firms that 
exist with decision-making power concerning pricing or output, the 
more likely it is that the market result will be socially desirable.117 
114. See, e.g., Handler, supra note 8; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8. It is sub-
mitted that the following standard may be derived from the criticism of the intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine: The separate firms in a parent-subsidiary organiza-
tion cannot be found to have conspired in violation of section 1 unless a factual 
situation similar to that found in Yellow Cab or Timken is presented. In other 
words, there can be no such conspiracy unless (1) the very combination of firms 
into a parent-subsidiary structure results from a prior conspiracy between independent 
"persons," as in Yellow Cab, or (2) the "parent" does not completely own the "sub-
sidiary," and the independent owners are furthering a conspiracy among themselves, 
as in Timken. Thus, under this rule, an internally created and wholly owned sub-
sidiary cannot conspire with its parent. Such a standard would reject the holdings, 
though perhaps not the results, of Kiefer-Stewart and Perma Life, which were both 
cases in which the Court held that internally created and wholly owned subsidiaries 
had conspired with the parent. 
However, while the standard suggested above does have theoretical appeal, its 
acceptance by the judiciary is unlikely. No court has ever adopted this position; 
moreover, it conflicts with rather explicit language in Kiefer-Stewart and Perma 
Life. Thus, given these constraints to reform in this area, the control theory sug-
gested by this Note is offered as the preferred method to remedy the intra-enterprise 
conspiracy problem. The proposed control standard is consistent with the decisions, 
both of the Supreme Court and lower courts, that have considered this issue. Unlike 
the "external effects" and "holding out" theories, see text at notes 90-106 supra, 
this standard would promote sound antitrust policy. 
115. See, e.g., United States v. Citizens & S. Natl. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975), 
where the Court observed: "The central message of the Sherman Act is that a busi-
ness entity must find new customers and higher profits through internal expansion-
that is, by competing successfully rather than by arranging treaties with its competi-
tors." 
116. See Stengel, supra note 8, at 12; Willis & Pitofsky, supra note 8, at 40-
41. 
117. Where independent firms agree to set prices, they reduce the number of 
economic units with market price discretion. Allocative inefficiency occurs where, 
for example, firms eliminate their discretion and agree to set prices above the mar-
ginal cost of production, which is the level toward which prices tend to move if 
many firms within the market freely compete with one another. Section I should 
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Thus, implicit in the section 1 prohibitions is the notion that the con-
spiracy must be among independent, competitive units-that is, the 
agreement of two or more separate "minds" on concerted action or 
restraint. 
However, when a parent corporation creates, wholly owns, and 
controls the day-to-day operations of one or more subsidiary corpo-
rations, two or more independent "minds" do not exist. Actual 
control, rather than mere ownership by the parent of the subsidiary's 
shares, 118 is what demonstrates that the management of the subsid-
iary is not autonomous. Where such control exists, it is incongruous 
to claim that a subsidiary can conspire with the parent or with other, 
similarly controlled, subsidiaries, 119 for there is no meeting of inde-
pendent "minds."120 Moreover, it would be absurd to expect that 
by creating liberal standards of intra-enterprise conspiracy, affiliates 
in a parent-subsidiary organization will be forced to compete with one 
another, increasing the number of units in the market with market 
discretion.121 Instead, -the enterprise would probably consolidate 
into a single corporate entity122 and forgo the advantages that may 
be derived from a multi-corporate structure. 
attack such agreements or coordinated behavior among independent firms that result 
in a decrease in the number of units with market discretion. Therefore, section 
1 should not apply if a parent firm forms subsidiaries and controls their day-to-day 
operations, since the entire enterprise only presents the market with one decision-
making unit. 
118. Actual control can occur if the management of the subsidiary is composed 
of officers, directors, or other employees of the parent and they in fact effectuate 
the policies of the parent. One may infer that Kingman Brewster, Jr., would attack 
a standard based on day-to-day control, for he has suggested that it seems "absurd 
to have antitrust legality tum on the particular form chosen for the exercise of 
[ownership] control, be it by vote, by informal directive, by management contract, 
by license, or by restrictive agreement." K. BREWSTER, JR., ANTITRUST AND AMERI-
CAN BusINESS ABROAD 185 (1955). However, under the standard suggested in this 
Note, a restrictive agreement or contract, as was found in Timken, indicates that 
in fact the parent does not control the management of the subsidiary; rather, the 
former must resort to a contract in order to curb the latter's autonomy. Brewster 
recognized that the form by which ownership control is exercised may be important 
when, prior to the passage quoted above, he noted that "the natural government re-
joinder to the·one-happy-family defense is that if the family ties are so strong, why 
use the shackles and bonds of 'heads of agreement'?" K. BREWSTER, JR., supra, at 
185. 
119. See United States v. Citizens & S. Natl. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975), 
discussed in text at notes 131-41 infra. 
120. On the other hand, when the parent does not exercise day-to-day control, 
and thus the autonomous subsidiary operates with market discretion, there is a 
stronger argument that the plurality element of section 1 is met. Furthermore, since 
such autonomous subsidiaries could operate independently without parental ownership 
and affiliation, the claim that such an organizational structure serves socially desir-
able and valid business purposes is weakened. 
121. See United States v. Citizens & S. Natl. Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 116 (1975); 
McQuade, supra note 8, at 213. 
122. United States v. Citizens & S. Natl. Bank, 422 U.S. 86 (1975), appears to 
preclude the finding that such integration would violate section 7 of the Clayton 
Act. See text at notes 131-41 infra. 
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Support for a theory based upon control may be found in cases 
that focus upon whether a parent (or other majority shareholder) 
of a corporation can be held liable for antitrust violations of that 
corporation. If day-to-day control exists, the courts will look through 
the form of independent existence and, on the basis of the substance 
of the relationship, hold the parent responsible.123 Acceptance of 
a control standard in this context supports its application to intra-
enterprise conspiracy, for it would be inconsistent to consider the 
parent and subsidiary as independent entities only for the purpose 
of creating plurality ( and therefore imposing liability) under section 1. 
As was argued in Section I of this Note, Yellow Cab, Timken, 
and Perma Life do not support the proposition that separately in-
corporated affiliates in a parent-subsidiary enterprise provide the re-
quired plurality for a finding of conspiracy.124 It was suggested that 
in each case the conspiracy rested on the agreements or actions of 
independent entities: in Yellow Cab, between Markin or Checker 
Cab and the later-acquired operating cab companies; in Timken, 
between American Timken and the Englishman Dewar;125 and in 
Perma Life, among the parties who entered into the explicit con-
tract.126 
For one wishing to limit the Supreme Court's implication of an 
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, Kiefer-Stewart presents the 
most problems. Although some have suggested that the basis of 
Seagram's liability may have been its establishment of a resale 
price maintenance scheme (where the "agreement" for section 1 
purposes was between the defendant subsidiaries and the indepen-
dent wholesalers), the argument is not compelling and the language 
of ,the case suggests that Justice Black did not have this rationale 
in mind.127 The weakness of this argument provides some expla-
nation for the emergence of the "holding out" theory; some have 
123. See National Dairy Prods. Corp. v. United States, 350 F.2d 321, 327 (8th 
Cir. 1965), vacated on other grounds, 384 U.S. 883 (1966). In that case the parent 
firm was held responsible for the subsidiary's price fixing agreements because the 
latter was not an "independent subsidiary" of the former but rather was operated 
by the parent "in accordance with . . . [its] policies and objectives and with inde-
pendent existence in form only." Compare United States v. Aluminum Co. of Amer-
ica, 148 F.2d 416, 442 (2d Cir. 1945), with United States v. General Elec. Co., 
82 F. Supp. 753, 843 (D.N.J. 1949), where the different results reached were based 
on the extent of control exercised by the parent over the day-to-day operations of the 
subsidiary. 
124. See text at notes 14-36, 46-60 supra. 
125. The control standard suggested in this Note could be used to explain Tim-
ken in another fashion. Although American Timken had ownership control of the 
two foreign firms, the latter were operated autonomously, as Dewar controlled the 
day-to-day operations of both of them. Thus, under the standard proposed here, 
the parent and the subsidiaries were independent enterprises and would not be pro-
tected from a finding of conspiracy. 
126. See text at notes 46-60 supra. 
127. See note 45 supra. 
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seen it as the only apparent limitation to Justice Black's expansive 
holding.128 However, the facts of the case are consistent with the 
control rationale proposed in this Note. Furthermore, the existence 
of day-to-day control might even be the implicit concern in situations 
where affiliates "hold themselves out as competitors." 
Both the Calvert and Seagram subsidiaries of Kiefer-Stewart 
determined their own policies and ran their day-to-day operations 
without direction or interference from the parent firm.120 Thus, the 
two subsidiaries each made independent market decisions. Rather 
than the single source of discretion that would have resulted had the 
parent controlled their operations, there were two "minds," two 
competitive forces, in the market. Because the parent did not con-
trol the operations of the subsidiaries, the entire enterprise was not 
protected from a finding that its various parts conspired. In short, 
the defendant enterprise in Kie/er-Stewart failed to come within the 
"safe-harbor" rule proposed here. 
Relying on Kie/er-Stewart, proponents of the "holding out" theory 
claim that an intra-enterprise conspiracy can only be found where 
affiliates are acting as competitors. But no antitrust problem is 
raised by the mere fact that affiliates so hold themselves out, espe-
cially if no one is misled.130 The holding out theory only makes 
sense if it is understood that the implicit concern over affiliates who 
hold themselves out as competitors in fact involves the issue of day-
to-day control. What seems crucial in such situations is that 
competing affiliates given the relevant market two or more sources 
of market discretion. If Kie/er-Stewart is a case of "holding out," 
it is one in which the two subsidiaries were autonomous and manage-
ment was completely decentralized. Any agreement or coordination 
between such affiliates eliminated one such source of discretion, there-
by eliminating a competitive force in the market. If the parent had 
controlled the operations of its subsidiaries to the point of depriving 
them of autonomy, then the entire enterprise would have presented 
the market with only one source of discretion--one "mind." 
Hence, the "holding out" theory only masks the real concern with 
day-to-day control. Using Kiefer-Stewart as guidance, where affili-
ates are holding themselves out as competitors, giving the market 
more than one source of market discretion, it is probably the case 
that the parent does not control the day-to-day operations of its off-
spring. Thus, the "holding out" theory should be subsumed under the 
control analysis proposed in this Note. 
Support for the control theory suggested here is reflected in recent 
cases decided both in the Supreme Court and in federal district 
courts. Although these courts have not expressly articulated a 
128. See text at notes 100-06 supra. 
129. See McQuade, supra note 8, at 206. 
130. See text at notes 105-06 supra. 
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theory of control, it is clear that this was the primary basis for •their 
decisions. 
In United States v. Citizens & Southern National Bank,131 the Su-
preme Court addressed alleged violations of both section 1 of the 
Sherman Act and section 7 of the Clayton Act. Citizens & Southern 
National Bank (Citizens) had organized a system of de facto branch 
banks to avoid a Georgia law prohibiting branch banking. Through 
the sponsorship and initiative of Citizens, five banks132 were founded, 
with five per cent of the shares of each held by Citizens and most 
of the rest held by parties friendly to Citizens. Citizens, however, 
controlled the day-to-day operations of the banks.133 After Georgia 
changed its branch-banking law, Citizens attempted to acquire the 
outstanding shares of the de facto branch banks to make them de 
jure branches. The Department of Justice then brought suit charging 
that the proposed acquisition violated section 7 of the Clayton Act 
and that the relations between Citizens and the de facto branches 
had violated section 1 of the Sherman Act.134 
Although the evidence indicated that there were substantial ties 
among the banks, that the banks followed similar pricing and service 
policies, 135 and that -they refrained from active competition with one 
another, the Supreme Court refused to find a conspiracy in violation 
of the Sherman Act. The de facto branches were considered to be 
part of a unitary organization, essentially a parent-subsidiary group 
with Citizens at the head: "Were we dealing with independent 
competitors having no permissible reason for intimate and continu-
ous cooperation and consultation as to almost every facet of doing 
business, the evidence adduced here might well preclude a finding 
that the parties were not engaged in a conspiracy . . . ."136 
131. 422 U.S. 86 (1975). 
132. A sixth bank operated as a de facto branch had been previously inde-
pendent. Because the Court and the FDIC considered this arrangement to present 
problems different from those involved with the other five banks, the Court's subse-
quent analysis was not applied to this bank. See 422 U.S. at 111 n.21. The problem 
posed by the sixth bank is precisely the difficulty avoided by the assumption made 
throughout this Note that the parent created and wholly owned the subsidiaries. See 
text at notes 35-36 supra. 
133. At one point, the court implied that the de facto branch banks had discre-
tion in their operations and thus were not controlled by Citizens. See 422 U.S. 
at 113. If this was so, then the case goes further than the standard suggested in 
this Note as to what situations are protected from a finding of conspiracy. However, 
the facts suggest that Citizens found it unnecessary to resort to explicit agreements 
with the managers of the de facto banks because it had chosen the banks' principal 
executive directors and had participated in the selection of their other directors, as 
well as supervised the operations and governance of each de facto branch bank. See 
422 U.S. at 93. Such day-to-day control by the parent is precisely the most appro-
priate form of control to exempt the enterprise from a finding of an intra-enterprise 
conspiracy. See 422 U.S. at 131-32 (Brennan, J., dissenting); note 118 supra. 
134. 422 U.S. at 90. 
135. See 422 U.S. at 113. 
136. 422 U.S. at 113-14 (emphasis added). 
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This reasoning implies the acceptance of a control theory such as 
that suggested here. Because the de facto branch banks were 
created and controlled by Citizens, and were not independent com-
petitors, no conspiracy was found.137 Had the de facto branch banks 
not been organized and controlled by Citizens but rather been inde-
pendent entities the evidence would, in the Court's view, have pre-
cluded a finding that there was no conspiracy .138 The crucial ele-
ments appeared to be creation and control, not the fact of owner-
ship, since Citizens only owned five per cent of the shares of the 
de facto branches.139 -
The Court's rationale in finding no violation of section 7 of the 
Clayton Act also supports the proposed control standard. In at-
tacking the permanent union of separate firms when the effect of 
such union is to restrain competition at the horizontal level, section 
7 addresses the same issues presented by a case under section 1 of 
the Sherman Act, which prohibits agreements among competitors 
that have an anticompetitive result. 140 In Citizens the Court said, 
in essence, that because Citizens created and controlled the other 
banks, the separate legal entities presented the market with only one 
competitive force, only one source of discretion. Thus, the act of 
becoming wholly owned subsidiaries would "extinguish no present 
competitive conduct,or relationships"141 and therefore would not vio-
late section 7. This is precisely the argument supporting the pro-
posed control standard: the parent's exercise of day-to-day control 
presents the market with only one decision-making unit. Hence, just 
as it would be inappropriate to apply the conspiracy provision of the 
Sherman Act, section 7 should not preclude the mergers in this case. 
Both provisions logically require the existence of at least two inde-
pendent decision-making units. 
Two recent federal district court cases have also utilized an analy-
sis such as that proposed here. In In re Penn Central Securities 
Litigation v. Pennsylvania Co., 142 the Pennsylvania Company 
(Pennco) had acquired a large majority of the shares of three inde-
137. See 422 U.S. at 114. 
138. 422 U.S. at 113-14. See note 132 supra. 
139. 422 U.S. at 93. 
140. However, the very language of section 7 of the Clayton Act distinguishes 
the relations between parent and subsidiaries from other situations: 
Nor shall anything contained in this section prevent a corporation engaged in 
commerce from causing the formation of subsidiary corporations for the actual 
carrying on of their immediate lawful business, or the natural and legitimate 
branches or extensions thereof, or from owning and holding all or a part of the 
stock of such subsidiary corporations, when the effect of such formation is not 
to substantially lessen competition. 
Clayton Act § 7, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970). Thus, unlike section 1 of the Sherman 
Act, section 7 explicitly views a parent-subsidiary corporation in a different light. 
141. 422 U.S. at 121. 
142. 367 F. Supp. 1158 (E.D. Pa. 1973). 
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pendent real estate development companies. Pennco used its 
ownership to elect a majority on each board of directors, all of the 
members of which were officers or directors of Pennco or of its 
parent, Penn Central Company. Pennco then used its control of the 
management to effectuate its policies by allocating markets, terri-
tories, and customers among the three subsidiaries. It is clear that 
had the parties not been affiliated at the time, or had the court ac-
cepted the Supreme Court's broad implication of intra-enterprise 
conspiracy, the market allocation arrangement would have been a 
conspiracy in violation of section 1.143 
In assessing whether there existed the "requisite multiplicity of 
actors necessary to form a conspiracy," the court concluded that the 
market allocation was merely "the normal internal management of 
a corporation which h~s chosen to operate through separately 
incorporated subsidiaries"144 and thus not a section 1 violation. At 
the very least, this indicates a refusal by the court to accept the broad 
implication of the intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine. Although 
there is some suggestion that the court in part embraced some 
version of the "effect" theory,145 its analysis clearly focused upon the 
common directors and officers of the companies and the imple-
mentation of policies that would contribute to the well-being of the 
whole Pennco enterprise.146 These factors were found to render the 
entire enterprise a single decision-making unit, incapable of con-
spiring within itself. This approach embraces the essence of the 
proposed control theory. . 
In the second recent case, Sulmeyer v. Seven-Up Company,141 
the plaintiff alleged that Seven-Up and its subsidiary, Seven-Up 
Export, had conspired in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act 
to reduce the export sales of plaintiff's competing soft drink syrup. 
Export had been created solely to be the agent of Seven-Up for 
foreign sales,148 and "[w]ith two exceptions, all of the directors 
143. See 367 F. Supp. at 1166. Because the parent and subsidiaries had been 
previously independent, the court might have found a conspiracy under the theories 
that are suggested to be the basis for Yellow Cab and Timken. See text at notes 
35-36 supra. 
144. 367 F. Supp. at 1166. 
145. The court considered it important to the resolution of the case that "no 
conspiracy directed at outsiders to the corporate family is alleged." 367 F. Supp. 
at 1166. For a discussion of the "effect" theory, see text at notes 90-99 supra. 
146. The court noted: 
Through this majority ownership it was able to elect the directors it desired 
and through them could put into action policies which would contribute to the 
corporate health of the whole Pennco enterprise. . . . We fail to see why this 
must be viewed as anything other than the normal internal management of a 
corporation which has chosen to operate through separately incorporated sub-
sidiaries. 
367 F. Supp. at 1166. 
147. 411 F. Supp. 635 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). 
148. See 411 F. Supp. at 640. 
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of Export have been either officers or directors of Seven-Up. . . . 
[There was also] evidence that Export never functioned as an 
independent entity."149 Had the court accepted the broad intra-
enterprise conspiracy doctrine implied by the Supreme Court, it 
would have found that the legally separate entities provided the re-
quisite plurality for a conspiracy. Instead, the court clearly rejected 
any such implication: 
[W]e are directed by the Supreme Court to look at substance over 
form [Yellow Cab], and while Export and Seven-Up did avail them-
selves of separate corporate status, Export was the subsidiary and 
agent of Seven-Up. "To hold otherwise would be to impose grave 
legal consequences upon organizational distinctions that are of de 
minimis meaning and effect .... "1 5° 
On this basis, the court held that Seven-Up and Export constituted 
one business entity and therefore dismissed the section 1 conspir-
acy allegations. 151 It is clear that the court followed the logic of the 
suggested standard.152 Because of Seven-Up's control, Export was 
a mere agent of its parent.153 Therefore, the formally separate firms 
did not constitute a plurality of actors required for a finding of con-
spiracy: there was only one source of market discretion-that is, only 
one "mind." 
149. 411 F. Supp. at 640. 
150. 411 F. Supp. at 640-41, quoting Sunkist Growers, Inc. v. Winckler & Smith 
Citrus Prods. Co., 370 U.S. 19, 29 (1962). 
151. See 411 F. Supp. at 640-41. 
152. Seven-Up and Export had an "Agency Agreement" that governed the opera-
tions of the subsidiary. 411 F. Supp. at 639-40. It might be argued that this evi• 
denced a lack of control on the part of Seven-Up. See note 118 supra. On the 
whole, however, the facts indicated that Seven-Up did control the day-to-day opera• 
tions of Export, see 411 F. Supp. at 640, and that the agency agreement merely 
outlined Seven-Up's purposes in forming the subsidiary. 
153, 411 F. Supp. at 640. 
